UNDP in Angola: A Miasma of Lies and deceit

The following is short summery of an issue covered very briefly in my book “Letters to Gabriella: Angola's Last War for Peace, What the UN Did and Why.”
It dates from 2000 and 2001 but is indicative of a mentality that still prevails within the UN senior management.
This mentality prescribes to the notion that all is well with the world, even if we have to lie and deceive (even to ourselves) in order to make it so.


During the first regular session held from 24-28 and 31 January 2000 in New York on the Extension Of The First Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) For Angola, Mark Malloch Brown sent an explanatory note to his friend Kofi Annan. Point three of this note, referring to the Angolan CCF from 1997-1999, says:


“The programmes achieved many positive results. Some of the notable ones are the vocational training programmes, community rehabilitation and revival of agriculture and economic livelihoods in six provinces, and capacity-building activities in the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Civil Service. With the onset of the conflict in Angola in late-1998, and based on discussions with the Government and other partners, the reintegration and community rehabilitation programmes have been shifted to provide vocational training and micro-enterprise services for displaced people in areas with security and access. The capacity-building programmes in the national institutions continue to be relevant in view of the increased government role in humanitarian assistance coordination, and discussions with the Bretton Woods institutions to undertake comprehensive economic reforms beginning in January 2000.”


Later that same year the “UNDP Angola Country Review -Review of the UNDP Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Angola (1997-2000)”, based on work undertaken in Angola 16 October to 3 November 2000 and submitted to the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola 23 November 2000 came to some rather contrary conclusions.


Their overall assessment makes the following statement:


“While these programmes were well conceived, relevant and important, they all suffered major problems for a number of reasons, and lasting results are very few. Principally, the success of immediate post-conflict activities depends on a secure environment, which was not (and has yet to be) fully achieved in Angola. The contribution by these programmes towards the achievement and consolidation of more peaceful conditions was limited, if any.”


Yet other factors influenced the implementation of these activities:
“Poor design of the actual projects, without adequate consultations with and ownership by the government institutions involved;
Weak programme management by UNDP and inadequate accountability by its institutional partners, especially UNOPS;
Inadequate transfer of technical and management expertise by external consultants to local staff; and
Inability by UNDP to quickly modify programmes to reflect the changing political and security environment. This includes the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.”


The country review stated quite clearly, that, with $65.9 million of funding available:


“UNDP had thus a very good starting point for the implementation of its CCF. However, as this Country Review will show, most programmes and projects suffered serious problems during implementation, some had to be terminated, and there are very few sustainable results at the end of the CCF. The big paradox is therefore: How could these seemingly good programmes produce so meagre results? Could this have been avoided? And what lessons can UNDP and the government draw from these experiences?”


This report mentions that it was not the first time that an evaluation reported on large scale failures by UNDP. The previous review, in 1997, identified a list of five weaknesses in the previous CCF.
These included:
· poor quality of national staff,
· high turnover of senior staff,
· lack of coherent and flexible strategy in the face of emergencies,
· no capacity in co-ordination and implementation of reintegration and rehabilitation roles and
· that the absence of translation facility delayed approval of project documents, but then goes on to say that:
“Unfortunately, only the last point has resulted in a remedial measure, while all other “lessons learned” did not lead to any substantial change – and indeed were thus not “learned” by UNDP in Angola. Similarly, practically none of the objectives and success indicators of the CCF were achieved during this period. The minimum requirement for the next CCF is that it establish more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP interventions and measurable performance indicators that permit evaluation and periodic assessment.”


(That last point was solved by the very simple expedient of employing a translator. In March 2001 this person was transferred to East Timor and to date (2007) not replaced. Thus even this very basic “remedy” was very short lived.)


Further observations from the report are:
“It seems equally evident that UNDP did not thoroughly scrutinize the proposed programmes and projects, before accepting funding.”

“The relationship between UNDP and government partners was not good at the central level during 1997-98.”

“Both NGO’s and private sector partners interviewed by the CR Team indicated that their experience with UNDP in the execution of projects to have been negative.”

“Experience in project execution through UNOPS has also appeared to be costly, bureaucratic and slow. . . Partners have questioned the quality of technical assistance particularly that recruited through UNOPS. The CR Team has not been able to find performance evaluations nor information on targets, indicators and outputs, which could corroborate these opinions.”

“Bureaucratic procedures have been employed by both UNDP and National partners to protect themselves and to provide excuses for inaction.”

“. . . the impact on communities targeted by programming in this sector has by and large been negative. High expectations have not been met, promised funding to community projects has been slow to deliver at best, and often not arrived. Local level leaders and NGO partners have lost credibility with their constituencies.”


The report concludes with a number of observations and recommendations:
“The above analysis uncovered serious weaknesses in the way the Country Office has functioned . . .”

“. . . the CO (Country Office) did not adequately support the implementation of these projects in a timely and efficient fashion but was rather seen as slow, bureaucratic and without transparency.”

“UNDP must also ensure that the inputs, especially the international advisors and consultants that are funded, are relevant, efficient, effective and client oriented.”

“The CR Team strongly believes that UNDP should not handle any more cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners, before it has drastically improved its own performance and efficiency.”



There are several disturbing aspects to these conclusions.
The first is that it appears that Mark Malloch Brown deliberately deceived his good friend, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as to exactly it was that the Angola Programme (at the time considered to be one of the more important UNDP programmes) was achieving. That would make him a liar.

An alternative explanation may be that Mark Malloch Brown was himself deceived by his managers responsible for Angola. That would make him incompetent.


There is just no honour amongst thieves.


Another disturbing aspect is that today (2007) most of the concerns raised by this report is as valid as it was in 2000.